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Introduction
It is unquestionable that the power gap between Brazil and its regional neighbors has increased dramatically in recent decades. 1 According to the Composite Index of National Capabilities (CINC), 2 Brazil's share of global power has increased moderately from 1.2 percent to 2.4 percent over the last 50 years, while its share of regional power has increased from 36 percent to 50 percent over the same period. This has meant that South America has been a unipolar subsystem since 1985. 3 1 Earlier versions of this working paper were presented at the Observatoire Politique de lʹAmérique latine et des Beckmann, for many thought-provoking insights on previous drafts.
2 The CINC is based on six indicators of international power: energy consumption, iron and steel production, military expenditure, military personnel, total population, and urban population.
3 A system turns from bipolar to unipolar when the most powerful country is more than two times the size of the second-most-powerful country. In South America, this happened in 1975 and then -and definitely -in 1985 , when Brazil's CINC became more than twice that of Argentina's (Martin 2006: 55) . Most studies on Brazilian foreign policy address the country's relations with other emerging powers or with great powers. However, it is evident that the rise of the South American colossus, while generating new parities at the systemic level, has produced subsystemic disparities that have affected its relations with other states in the region (Malamud 2011; Lima 2013; Flemes and Wehner 2015) . There has been increasing awareness of and concern about the effects this change has had -and probably will have -in the Brazilian backyard. Moreover, a lively debate has ignited around a forthcoming edited volume entitled Latin American Reactions to the Rise of Brazil (Gardini and Tavares de Almeida 2014) and the latest issue of International Politics (Flemes and Lobell 2015) , where several scholars address this issue from different perspectives.
Such academic interest seems to be justified by a patent empirical riddle. Realism 4 stands as the single international relations (IR) theory that addresses the expected effects of changes in relative power. In a nutshell, it predicts that in a unipolar -yet not hegemonic -South
America the power gap between Brazil and its more powerful neighbors should drive the latter to counterbalance by increasing their capabilities or reorganizing their regional and extraregional alliances (cf. Waltz 1979; Mares 1988; Huntington 1999) . Nonetheless, this has not consistently occurred. South American secondary powers may have contested Brazilian leadership at times, with varied intensity (Flemes and Wehner 2015) , 5 but this behavior has not been consistent across cases and years.
What explains the South American underreaction to the Brazilian rise? Neoclassical realism proposes an answer to the paradox, asserting that inconsistent balancing or bandwagoning strategies may be attributable to certain domestic conditions that prevent a coherent response to subsystemic incentives (Rose 1998; cf. Abb 2013) . This article tests the plausibility of such an explanation by analyzing unipolarity in South America from 1985 to 2014. In doing so, it focuses on long-term strategic trends, thereby differentiating itself from foreign policy analyses based on short-term data (cf. Lobell et al. 2015) .
The article is divided into three sections. The first section explains how Brazil's neighbors' foreign policies could be expected to have developed in the absence of domestic constraints. A second section identifies certain domestic variables that may have intervened, preventing such behavior. A third section contrasts these explanations with other competing hypotheses using crisp-set qualitative comparative analysis (csQCA). The article closes with 4 In a broad sense that encompases balance of power theory, hegemonic stability theory and also power transition theory.
5 The umbrella concept of "contestational politics" involves a variety of foreign policy instruments -for example, alliance building, entangling diplomacy, binding, omni-enmeshment, balking, hedging or fence sittingwhich can be interpreted as alternatives to a soft-balancing strategy (cf. Pape 2005; Paul 2005 ). Daniel Flemes and Leslie Wehner (2015) apply this concept to South America and find some evidence of strategic contestation in the region. However, secondary regional powers in South America have behaved very differently from each other, with some changing their strategy several times since the inception of regional unipolarity in 1985.
This article attempts to explain these different behaviors. conclusions regarding how government instability, limited party-system institutionalization, and powerful presidents have diverted the attention of political elites and foreign policy executives from the challenges generated by a rising Brazil.
The International Level: Power Distribution and Foreign Policy Behavior
This article argues that it is the combined effect of international and domestic variables that has given shape to South American international politics. For the sake of clarity, this section explores the international variables first. Therefore, it focuses on states as the main actors in and relative capabilities as the main determinants of foreign policy outcomes, while ceteris paribus is assumed for any other international or domestic variables. Thus, to begin with, South America is imagined as a neorealist subsystem of unitary, rational, and self-interested countries (Waltz 1979) . 6
The neorealist logic was omnipresent in South American foreign policy decision-making before the 1980s. In fact, the balancing of power was the standard behavior in the region until the competitive Argentine-Brazilian bipolarity gave way to Brazilian primacy and cooperative unipolarity (Martin 2006; Lima 2013) . Since then, secondary regional powers such as Argentina have not attempted to counter the Brazilian rise by increasing their own capabilities through internal balancing or by reorganizing alliances through external balancing. 6 Waltz does not develop a theory of how subsystems behave. He says instead that "A general theory of international politics is necessarily based on the great powers. [However,] The theory once written also applies to lesser states that interact insofar as their interaction s are insulated from the intervention of the great powers of a system" (Waltz 1979: 73 the other hand, superpower intervention is a resource that they potentially can mobilize against their regionʹs major power. The superpower and the secondary regional powers will thus often, although not always, share converging interests against major regional powers, and secondary regional powers will have little incentive to join in a coalition against the superpower. (Huntington 1999: 42) The logic highlighted by Samuel Huntington is clear. Brazil has without a doubt "sufficient material capabilities to project power in its regional [South American] environment … which assumes a typically unipolar distribution" (Lima 2013: 190) . Of course, material capabilities are not power per se, but "… are the raw material out of which power relationships are forged" (Baldwin 2013: 277) ; therefore, given that Brazil represents 50.5 percent of the regional CINC and 55.6 percent of the regional GDP, it is not unreasonable to think that the country could eventually pose a threat to (cf. Walt 1985) or be perceived as a threat by (cf.
Jervis 1976) the neighborhood, even if it appears unlikely in the short term. In other words, 7 Laura Gomes-Mera (2013) provides evidence based on interviews with top policymakers that shows how MERCOSUR served as a defensive strategy against the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), but this is different from stating that Argentina had structural incentives for forming a strategic alliance with Brazil. Two pieces of evidence contradict Gomes-Mera's claim. On the one hand, the Argentina-Brazil cooperation started through regional unipolarity, way before the unipolar world came into being: "the initial rapprochement occurred much earlier, under the military regimes in 1979-1980, and economic integration proceeded under democratic governments in the 1980s" (Darnton 2012: 120; cf. Resende-Santos 2002 (Wohlforth 1999: 31) To summarize, there seems to be agreement in the literature on how subsystemic incentives should have operated in a unipolar region where Brazil was waxing but the United States remained a proximate and powerful regional hegemon . On the one hand, secondary regional powers -Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Peru, and Venezuela -should have contested Brazilian primacy in a consistent manner. On the other hand, small states historically at loggerheads with secondary regional powers and significantly less empowered -Bolivia, Ecuador, Paraguay, and Uruguay -should have bandwagoned the South American giant. 8 Figure 2 shows how the regional balance of power should, according to a realist perspective, have been since 1985.
Figure 2: CINC Country Share and Expected Behaviors in South America
Notes: The x-axis and the y-axis both represent the distance from Brazil in terms of the CINC using the formula CINCBR+CINCX 2 . The area inside the circles represents each country's share of the CINC. Source: CINC mean, 1984 CINC mean, -2013 ; Correlates of War.
8 The difference between secondary regional powers and small states is that the former have enough resources to affect the subsystem by forming alliances with a relatively small number of their peers. Small states, in contrast, have so little power that they would have to coordinate huge alliances to generate an effect (cf. Mare 1988). Considering structural factors such as trade interdependence and military expenditures in order to assess balancing in South America is of utmost importance. This allows us to distinguish, unlike previous studies (cf. Flemes and Wehner 2015) , between states that really do soft-balance and those that, despite some "contestational" tactics, do not actually apply a long-term soft-balancing strategy. 9 Similarly, many studies have confused bandwagoning with tactic convergence. However, a certain country's support for foreign policy initiatives, joint membership in regional institutions (Burges 2015) , or friendly declarations (GomezMera 2013) do not guarantee that it does not see Brazil as a threat.
This article focuses on structural conditions. It is not as much about perceptions, threats, and short-term balancing (Walt 1985; cf. Wehner 2014) as it is about capabilities and longterm precautions (Waltz 1979 ). The point is that even if no South American country is obsessed with the possibility of conflict in the short-term, some countries do consider the probability -as low as it may be -and thus have long-term independent strategies (cf. Brooks 1997). Therefore, secondary regional powers that remain commercially autonomous from Brazil and maintain some degree of military readiness still behave as balancers of some sort. On the one hand, Uruguay is the only small state in South America that consistently bandwagons with Brazil, as evidenced by its trade interdependence and military expenditures.
However, while President Mujica has literally stated that Uruguay should "jump on Brazil's wagon," 11 all the other small states have thwarted Brazil's plans, be it by nationalizing Petrobras' facilities (Bolivia), blocking Venezuela's admission into MERCOSUR (Paraguay), or disturbing regional stability because of domestic quarrels and border crises (Ecuador).
On the other hand, Chile and Colombia are the only secondary powers that have secured some margin for maneuver vis-à-vis Brazil, both in the commercial and the defense realms.
Unlike Argentina and Venezuela, Chile has gently rejected the pressure to participate in MERCOSUR since the organization's very inception and has used the UNASUR Defense Council to monitor Brazilian doctrines and expenditures (Nolte and Wehner 2014) . Colombia is a more reckless balancer. It once overtly defied the UNASUR project by signing a deal allowing the United States to use its military bases. Chile and Colombia are by far Brazil's most cunning and wary middle-size neighbors.
Besides Chile and Colombia, regional soft-balancers, and Uruguay, a regional bandwagoner, all the other countries contradict realist predictions. Peru, for instance, is a secondary regional power whose behavior resembles the balancing ideal, but its military budget is too low, 1.3 percent of its GDP, for it to be considered a coherent balancer. Bolivia and Paraguay, on the other side, are small countries whose behavior is close to the ideal bandwagoning type, but they are not interdependent enough with Brazil.
Other cases, like Argentina, Ecuador, and Venezuela, bluntly contradict theoretical expectations. Argentina behaves as a bandwagoner: Brazil is its major trading partner and it has the lowest military expenditures -as a share of GDP (0.9 percent) -in the region. Venezuela is less commercially interdependent with Brazil but shows a similar tendency: its trade has shifted considerably from Colombia towards Brazil, now its major trading partner in South Table 1 and deserves special attention.
In the past, some have explained the absence of consistent balancers or bandwagoners as being due to the thick normative nature of South American international society (Merke 2015) . Others have focused on short-term tactics -rather than long-term structural constraints -softening the realist lexicon and switching the emphasis to the analysis of Brazil's "leadership" instead of its primacy (Malamud 2011; Burges 2015) . The next section explains why most countries in the region have not implemented any consistent balancing or bandwagoning strategies vis-à-vis Brazil. Neoclassical realism (Rose 1998 ) offers insights on the problem, asserting that inconsistent balancers or bandwagoners may have particular domestic characteristics that explain their behavior.
The Domestic Level: Institutions Constraining Foreign Policy
We will now look inside the "black box" of the state to understand how and why neorealist previsions have not taken place in some countries while they have in others.
Following Randall Schweller, it could be said that the most immediate variable affecting a country's assertion that there is a potential threat is elite consensus on its existence. If a particular country's political elite is divided on whether or not to balance, the expected balancing behaviors may be inconsistent or may never be exhibited. Therefore, elite and social cohesion, as well as regime stability, are the key variables for understanding foreign policy behavior, as the following causal scheme shows (Schweller 2006: 63 When the internal politics are unstable and mandates are at stake, the national arena becomes almost as harsh and anarchic as that of international politics. In the event of low party institutionalization and recurrent government crises, South American presidents are not expected to pay much attention to the power transitions taking place in their region. Foreign policy is more likely to become a tool for accumulating domestic power, and countries that would have otherwise been rivals can become allies or be ignored.
Paradigmatic cases like Argentina and Venezuela suggest that two foreign policy behaviors are to be expected from "divided" countries. First, the concentration of veto power in the president should cause foreign policy instability (Tsebelis 2002) . Second, domestic turmoil should lead to the underestimation of international threats, an internally oriented foreign policy, and behaviors at odds with neorealist expectations. The story looks more or less like this:
Rise of an external threat  high (low) party-system institutionalization * representative (delegative) president * government stability (instability)  neorealist (no neorealist) behavior Very concrete empirical questions can be addressed to determine whether South American countries are closer to the "unitary" or "divided" ideal type: Have these countries' presidents completed their mandates? Are their party systems institutionalized? Are their presidents delegative? Table 2 summarizes these data. Not surprisingly, countries with recurrent presidential crises, hyperpresidentialism, and greater electoral volatility -that is, "divided" countries -are the ones that are at odds with neorealist expectations and that have more unstable foreign policies. The first row in Table 2 The two secondary regional powers that have clearly underbalanced, Argentina and Venezuela, as well as the small state that has been more reluctant to bandwagon, Ecuador, are precisely those that have experienced more presidential crises, greater electoral volatility, and stronger executives. In these cases, domestic instability has resulted in significant foreign 13 The picture would be far more dramatic if failed coups or crises that did not lead to presidential or legislative breakdowns were considered. In Colombia, César Gaviria and Ernesto Samper had to face corruption scandals that threatened their governments in 1991 and 1996, respectively. This was also the case for Jaime Paz Zamora in Bolivia, González Macchi in Paraguay, and Rodrigo Borja in Ecuador, among others. Venezuelan coup d'état attempts in 1992 and 2002 are also not considered in Table 1 as long as they did not succeed in ousting the president. In all of these cases an institutional arrangement was possible and both legislative and executive powers stood.
14 Lucas González measures O'Donnell's celebrated concept for the first time by asking regional experts to classify every country with regard to eight characteristic attributes of delegative democracies. Those attributes are as follows: "i) the president is taken to be the embodiment of the nation, custodian, and definer of its interests, ii) the policies of his government need bear no resemblance to the promises of his campaign; iii) the president's political base is a political movement, presenting himself as above both political parties and organized interests, iv) other institutions, such as courts and legislatures, are considered impediments to the exercise of power, v) the exercise of power is noninstitutionalized, vi) the president nominates isolated and shielded téc-nicos to office, vii) extremely weak or nonexistent horizontal accountability and viii) swift policymaking -a higher likelihood of gross mistakes, hazardous implementation, and the president taking responsibility for the outcome" (González 2013: 7) . The index of Latin American presidents' legislative powers and partisan powers provided by Kitschelt et al. (2010: 222; cf. Shugart and Carey 1992) reaches similar conclusions for almost every case besides Uruguay, whose presidency seems stronger. Of course, many institutional changes occurred in most South American countries from 1985 to 2013, so this indicator -like any other -must be taken as an approximation of the concept of hyperpresidentialism.
15 Although this article does not aim to discuss the Brazilian case, this country exhibits a particular history. Even though Brazil saw one president ousted, in 1992, its domestic politics changed dramatically after the Plano Real and economic stabilization (Panizza 2000) , becoming those of a very unitary actor. In line with our hypothesis, it was only in this late period that Brazil started behaving as an emerging power. and economic policies (Levitzky and Roberts 2011) . This section has shown that those conclusions could be extended to foreign policy as well.
A Qualitative Analysis of the Neoclassical Realist Hypothesis
In the first section, this article considered a single variable or condition with which to explain South American foreign policies: national capabilities. A second section amended this simplistic view by adding three more conditions: party-system institutionalization, government stability, and presidential character. This section offers a far more complex understanding of regional politics, considering every other explanatory variable in a comparative test of the paper's hypothesis.
From an intuitive perspective, the above explanation of South American foreign policies seems to coherently describe the regional subsystem during the three decades of Brazilian unipolarity. However, a detailed and systematic examination of this argument should be undertaken in order to test the internal and external validity of the aforementioned hypothesis.
So far, a relationship between the alleged "cause" and "effect" has been detected, but two things are still unknown: whether the presumed cause does temporally precede the effect 20
and whether there are alternative explanations for this same phenomenon. A comparative test is conducted here to solve the second of these remaining puzzles.
As is usually the case in IR, the number of cases -the nine South American neighbors of Brazil -is not sufficient to apply statistics. Among the comparative methods for small-N analysis, fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA) also requires more than 25 cases.
Therefore, crisp-set qualitative comparative analysis (csQCA) seems to be the most suitable method to test for alternative hypotheses (Rihoux and Ragin 2009).
Based on Boolean algebra and set theory, csQCA is a simple configurational comparative analysis of dichotomous variables -conditions that are either present or not present -for a small number of cases. If every alternative hypothesis has been introduced to the analysis, then this method compares on a case-by-case basis, giving a solution in terms of an INUS condition -that is, the insufficient but necessary parts of a condition which is itself unnecessary but sufficient to explain a certain outcome. Therefore, if low party-system institutionali-20 An important contribution of this article has been to overcome theoretical underspecification and allow for replication and testing by developing a more observable account of causal mechanisms determining South
American states' foreign policy stability and rationale. However, these mechanisms are far from proven. Even if it is well known that a set of South American countries has evolved similarly with regard to their party systems and political economy (cf. Flores-Macías 2012; Roberts 2012), there are competing explanations for these resemblances, and the link between these countries' paths and foreign policy behavior is far from evident.
Process-tracing methodology (Beach and Pedersen 2013) could be used to check for the actual existence of these mechanisms, with each South American country taken as a case study. However, this would be impossible to do within a single article. would argue that regime types, the level of economic interdependence, and the presence of international institutions could affect bilateral cooperation (Keohane 1989) . In Table 3 Furthermore, since trade flows -to Brazil -are another dimension of our dependent variable, it could be said that the presence of protectionist interest groups may affect trade volumes.
Therefore, the strength of trade unions is introduced to the analysis by considering trade union density and trade union concentration scores (Roberts 2002: 15; cf. Kitschelt et al. 2010 ).
Finally, geopolitical factors like the Pacific or Atlantic orientation of each case as well as its geographical proximity to the United States are also included in the test. Table 3 contains several alternative responses to the main question posed by this article.
However, a csQCA analysis of these conditions presents a "limited diversity" problem since there are too many conditions for too few cases (Rihoux and Ragin 2009: 27 
Realist behavior towards Brazil
Notes: Government instability, electoral volatility, and delegative democracies data was transformed into dichotomous data to permit csQCA analysis. Countries are considered to have weak trade unionism if they score less than 6.5 in the aforementioned index based on Kenneth Roberts (2002) pothesis, it will not be able to discard the possibility that a combination of these factors could also explain neorealist behavior.
Given the fact that a combination of other conditions could still explain the outcome, we proceed with a second analysis, combining all liberal explanations and all military-related explanations into two new categories and testing whether these combined explanations can compete with our main hypothesis. 22 When this second test is run with the Kirk software, the results are consistent again. A necessity test shows a "unified elite" -that is, government stability, institutionalized party systems, and representative presidents combined -as the only necessary condition for neorealist behavior. Because there are zero cases with a unified elite, a strong military, and liberal constraintsthat is, the true/true/false configuration is a logical remainder as shown in Table 4 -we cannot be sure that this is a sufficient condition for such behavior. However, the test also shows that a divided elite is a sufficient condition for non-neorealist behavior. In other words, a sufficiency test, when asked for a parsimonious solution, also shows "unified elite" as the unique INUS condition with full consistency and coverage (1.00).
22 I would like to thank Aníbal Pérez-Liñán for the idea of undertaking this overarching analysis by combining previous categories into three broad hypotheses. 
Conclusion
In recent decades, many have argued that neorealist interpretations of international politics have not applied to South America after democratization. However, this article shows that the balance-of-power logic still applies, though it is filtered by specific domestic constraints.
The paper's argument has been carefully developed. The first section analyzed the question of whether there are international incentives for secondary regional powers to balance or to bandwagon, reaching the conclusion that ceteris paribus -that is, in the absence of an explicit threat -the distribution of capabilities generates no clear incentives to ally with Brazil.
Since Brazil's primacy is overwhelming -and steadily increasing -there are instead incentives to balance or at least secure military and economic autonomy. For small states, there are incentives to bandwagon with Brazil.
Having identified Chile, Colombia, and Uruguay as consistent neorealist players, the second section arrived at the conclusion that government stability, party-system institutionalization, and "representative" presidents -as opposed to delegative presidents or hyperpresidentialism -are necessary to explain neorealist behavior. These findings were tested, in the third section, against alternative hypotheses using csQCA analysis. The results held, showing that government stability, institutionalized party systems, and a constrained president are INUS conditions for explaining foreign policies' consistency with neorealism.
However, csQCA methods have important shortcomings. First, they do not allow for generalization, which means that these results are valid only for South American international politics from democratization onwards. Second, in the process of dichotomizing independent variables or conditions, much information has been lost. Third, much work still needs to be done to better specify the causal mechanisms connecting the aforementioned conditions with foreign policy making. In this sense, this article is intended simply as a starting point for a debate on how the regional subsystem, together with domestic politics, affects international relations in South America.
